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There has been a fundamental change in the character of congressional 
elections in the past twenty years. The number of congressional elections 
won by greater than 55 percent of the vote has increased greatly. ' One ex-
planation for the increased number of safe seats has stressed effective in-
cumbent use of staff, free trips to the district and other advantages of their 
office. This research will test the hypothesis that U.S. House incumbents 
have been able to create safe seats by using the perquisites of a congres-
ional offi ce. 
Literature 
Fiorina vividly describes the creation of a safe congressional district. 
He examines two traditionally marginal districts of which one became safe 
in I 964. 2 The behavior of legislators in these two districts is revealing; the 
legislator from the district that remained marginal devoted much time to 
policy affairs in Washington while the member in the safe district concen-
trated on consitutent affairs. The safe legislator established a personal 
presence in the district by moving among gatherings during frequent trips 
home. He used the advantages of th~ office, Washington and district staff, 
and maintained three field offices. Fiorina concludes that the safe district 
resulted from the deemphasis of controversial policy positions and the " ... 
emphasis of nonpartisan, nonprogrammatic constituency service. " 1 Other 
research supports Fiorina's conclusions. Born, for example, also believes 
that the rise in incumbent safety has resulted from freshmen elected since 
1966 obtaining greater electoral rewards from their first term. Born suggests 
that new members " ... induced voting shifts in their favor by effectively 
capitalizing on the opportunities of incumbencies.',. 
The 11,ssons of Fiorina's tale have not been _overlooked by con-
gressmen. Newer and more marginal members especially are using the op-
portunities provided by a congressional office to enhance constituency serv-
ice and contact. Cover' notes that more narrowly elected members take full 
advantage of the franking privilege and have a higher monthly mailing rate 
than other members. All members, especially the most recently elected, 
have been aided by increased free trips home and are returning to the 
district more frequently. 6 In spite of this evidence, there is little research 
that links the use of the opportunities of a congressional office to increased 
vote for incumbents. 
One source of data that has been used to research such a link is the SRC 
national election studies . Since 1978 these studies have identified methods 
by which voters have been contacted by congressional candidates. Using 
these data Mann and Wolfinger find that the use of constituent-service ac-
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tivities has resulted in the incumbent being better known in the distr" 
also being confronted by relatively less well-know n challeict Ind 
Abramowitz finds that contacts with constituents have produced favngers.' 
evaluations of the incumbent which may be of electoral benefit. • Jacorable 
~uggests tha~ inc~m~ents benefit from various activities including ad~~~n 
mg and credit cla1mmg, and that these advantages accrue pr ior to the r 71s-
tion campaign. 9 ec cc. 
. Thes: studies ~~e enlighteni~g but their con~lusions must be consider 
with caution . Leg1t1mate questions may be raised conce rn ing the ca Cd 
direction of the relationship between contacts and can dida te evaluat~sal 
Dexter, for example, notes that legislators are more likely to be conta~~ 
by constituents that agree with them. '0 The SRC findings may be les 
product of contacts enhancing candidate evaluation an d mor e a resui/ a 
those favoring the legislator not being passive recipients but instead activ ~r 
seeking such contacts. Also, the small N of the SRC stu dies may prod : Y 
uncertain findings. The 1978 SRC survey sampled only about •= 
respondents in a district and not all of these had cont act with the incum. 
bent. Clearly, another approach would be valuable in providing both a 
unique perspective of the relationship between the use of a congressional of. 
fice and vote and perhaps to bolster the SRC findings. 
Unfortunately, there have been few attempts to specify a direct link 
between use of a congressional office and vote for incumbents. Brown 
Fuchs, and Hoadley's analysis of a subset of House Demo crats from th; 
class of 1974 discovered that variables such as staffing, tri ps to the district 
and phone calls were unrelated to reelection success. 11 The only substantial 
predictor of incumbent vote was campaign spending . Johannes and 
McAdams found that casework, as determined by staff estimates of the 
number of cases and projects processed in a legislator's office, had no 
statistically significant impact upon vote for incumbents in the 1978 con-
gressional elections . 12 Born did not find an impact of sta ffing on vote for 
House incumbents . 13 
One explanation for the failure of these studies to find a relationship 
between perquisite use and incumbent vote is that they studied both 
marginal and non-marginal districts. It is plausible that the impact of per-
quisite use on vote for incumbents would be most effecti ve in marginal 
districts . While perquisites may be responsible for transfor ming a marginal 
into a safe district, there is no reason to believe that this relat ionship is con-
tinuous in producing even safer districts. As shown in Figure 1, it is in the 
marginal districts (shaded area) that perquisite use may affect vote and it is 
here that efforts to measure this relationship should be directed . 
There are several possible reasons that perquisite use will not increase 
vote percent once a district has become safe. The first reaso n relates to the 
electoral nature of a district. There are likely to be limits beyond which a 
legislator's share of the vote cannot be increased no matter what the level of 
perquisite use . There are always some voters, for example strong identifiers 
of the challenger's party, who would not vote for the inc umb ent under any 
conditions. Alford and Hibbing provide support for this by demonstrati ng 
that, after an initial rapid growth, incumbent vote ten ds to sta bili ze at about 
67 percent.,. 
The changing goals of congressmen may affect the relationship be-
tween perquisite use and incumbent vote. As members beco me safe they are 
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likely to continue using the advantages of their offices, but the focus of this 
use will shift from primarily electoral to other goals. Hibbing notes that 
congressmen tire of constant campaigning while neglecting their families. 15 
Safe legislators are therefore likely to enjoy their security and use trips 
home and days in the district for family rather than political reasons. Fenno 
notes that the district political activities members do engage in will be 
devoted to protecting the existing electoral base rather than expansion. 16 
During this 'protectionist' stage of their career " ... House members 
become less interested in building supportive constituencies and most con-
cerned about keeping electoral support already attained."" Also, electorally 
secure members may become more involved with their policy interests and 
reassign staff from political to legislative duties. Fenno found that safe 
legislators tend to pursue other goals such as policy or influence in the 
House. 11 Safe legislators continue to use the advantages of their office but 
this use may be directed toward different goals and may confound the 
relationship between perquisites and incumbent vote. 
Research Design 
To measure the impact of perquisite use on incumbent vote we examined 
a large number of cases over several elections in the most marginal districts 
in Congress. The districts studied were selected by analyzing vote returns in 
House districts for the five elections from 1960 through 1968. To be 
selected, a district's average Democratic vote for the five elections could 
vary only between 40 and 60 percent with no district in any one year fluc-
tuating outside of the 35 to 65 percent range. 19 Using this rule we were able 
to select 86 districts which were the most marginal in Congress from 1960 
through 1968. 20 Having determined the districts with a historical record of 
marginality we then analyzed the relationship between constituency-service 
variables on incumbent vote in elections from 1972 through 1978. 21 If there 
is a relationship between constituency service and vote for incumbent, it 
should be visible in these previously marginal districts. 
The dependent variable is incumbents' share of the two-party vote. 
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There are two categories of ind~pendent variables. The first mea sures th 
ability of perquisites to affect vote. The second category consists of n e 
perquisite variables that may also affect incumbents vote; these are inclu~~ 
to more completely specify the model. e 
Perquisite Independent Variables 
There are two means by which the advantages of a congress ional offi 
enable a legislator to curry favor with constituents. First, the advantagce 
enhance the ability of a legislator to personally pay attentio n to the distric~s 
Second, the perquisites provide surrogates for the legislator, in the form of 
staff, who provide various services for constituents. Both personal and sur-
rogate attention may be effective in increasing support amo ng constituents 
and it is necessary to include both types of variables in the mod el. 
An important perquisite that legislators receive is free trips to the 
district. These trips help the incumbent give personal attention to district af. 
fairs. The first independent variable, therefore, is the num ber of trips the 
incumbent takes to the district. This variable is somewhat incomplete as it 
does not indicate how long the incumbent remained in the district. The 
longer the legislator is in the district the more time that is ava ilable for 
building support with constituents. Length of stay, therefore , may be im-
portant in explaining incumbent vote and was included as an independent 
variable. 
The number of trips and days were relatively easy to com pute when 
round-trip vouchers were filed with the Clerk of the House. 22 When one-
way vouchers were filed we credited the incumbent with one tri p and one 
day spent in the district since no assumption about the lengt h of the visit 
could be made . Those members who received a yearly lump-sum reimbur se-
ment for their trips were excluded from the analysis since it was impossible 
to determine either the number of days or trips. 23 
The second group of perquisites that may affect vote are staff. 
Through casework, staff are in contact with thousands of constit uents and 
have the potential for a substantial impact on vote. The meas ure s of this 
perquisite are the number of (1) Washington staff (2) district staff 
(3) district offices. 2 • Each of these measures, in different ways, ma y affect 
constituents' vote decisions . Washington staff resolve constituent problems 
with the federal bureaucracy. District staff interact with cons tituents and 
serve as a link with Washington. District offices are a symbol of the 
members' presence in the district and provide access to staff.2 5 Each 
legislator will emphasize different elements of these three staff measures. It 
is necessary, therefore, to include all three measures in the model. 
Non-Perquisite Independent Variables 
The second category of independent variables more fully specifies the 
model of incumbent vote. The first variable in this category is expected 
district vote. Most incumbents quickly establish a base of support con sisting 
of those voters committed to the candidate. 2 6 The use of perq uisites is not 
intended to fully explain all of the incumbents' vote but only that increment 
above the base. For each election the base was calculated as the incumbent 
party's average vote for the previous five elections. 
The srrength of the challenger is an important factor that affects vote 
for the incumbent. There exists a strong negative relationship betwe en the 
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1 vel of cha llenger spending and incumbent vote. 
21 Given this relationship, 
;e measure of challenger strength will be challenger spending. Since 
hallenger spending has a constantly diminishing effect on incumbent vote, 
~his varia~ le was used in a natural logarithmic form to properly specify this 
relationship . 
Analysis 
At the outset, it is important to note that use of the district service is 
becoming increasingly popular in Congress. In Table 1 it can be seen that 
the members of our 86 districts have increased the use of the activities from 
J968 to 1976. These congressmen must feel that there is some utility in the 
use of the advantages of their office. 
umber of Tr ips To Dis1rict 
Oa)'S pent in District 
TABLE I 
increase of Congressional Entrepreneurial Acdvlties 
- Mran Uvels of At1lvl1ies by Year For 
District s (N = 86)-
1968 1970 1972 
12.4 21.9 34.8 
80.0 128.9 183.0 
umber of Staff In Washington Office 6.2 6.6 7.0 
umber of Staff In District Office 2.2 2.6 2.8 
Number of Ois1ric1 Offices 1.3 1.4 1.4 
1974 1976 
36.8 46.2 
192.0 166.7 
7,9 8.7 
3.9 5. 1 
1.9 2. 1 
Ordinary least-squares was used to estimate the effect of the indepen-
dent varia bles on the dependent variable. 28 While challenger spending did 
affect vote, there is no consistent relationship between the district-service 
variables an d vote for the incumbent. Born and Alford and Hibbing suggest 
that the major increase in support for incumbents occurs during the first 
several reelec tions. 29 •30 With this in mind we reestimated the model using 
only the first and second reelection contests. This model also failed to ex-
hibit a relationship. We must conclude that, at least in this study, that district 
attention does not have an independent effect on incumbent vote. 
TABLE 2 
OLS EstimattS of Co nsti1ut:ncy Modd 
Dtptndent V1ri1blt- lnc::umbenl / Vote/ Ptrctnl 
1972 1974 1976 1978 
Intercept 652.955• 599.702° 687.3!0 ' 477,618' 
(168,914) (121.994) (82,879) (99.541) 
District A vcragc - .0627 .1209 - .227) , )487 
(.0264) (. 1663) (.1338) (. 1594) 
Challenger Spending - 1.622' - 1.360' - 1.027' - 3.986 ' 
(Thousands of Dollars) (.4174) (.2507) (. 1563) (. ) 197) 
Trips Home - 2. 144 .9527 1.124 1.497 
(2.818) (1.428) (.7798) (I.I 17) 
Days in District -, )107 - .5932' -. 2092 - .0289 
(.2989) (.2117) (. 1419) (.2062) 
District Staff 12. 14 2.679 2,827 - 2.501 
(I 1.89) (9,890) (5.052) (5.871) 
District Offices 24.31 12.85 - 3.054 - 3. 188 
(23.36) (16.39) (10. 12) (11.69) 
Washington Staff 4.042 8.700 15.09 ' 7.340 
(9,654) (6.437) (4,408) (5,369) 
R' 
.27 .49 ,48 .36 
F Value 3.66• 7.78• 7.64' 4.97' 
' p .05 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
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Conclusion 
As did Johannes and McAdams we find no direct empirical evidence f 
any relationship between constituent service and House incumbents' el 0 
toral success even in districts with a history of margin ality . 11 We :· 
reasonably certain that this finding is not an artifact of distorte d data. It .e 
logical to expect the Clerk data to be fairly accurate. Since these data ~ s 
generated from expense vouchers submitted by legislators for reimburs e 
ment, few would fail to apply for expenses incurred as part of their jo~-
Even if random error existed, we could not expect this to totally negate a rela~ 
tionship between constituent service and vote. Moreover, the staffing data 
are highly accurate and also failed to demonstrate a relationship between 
district attentiveness and vote. 32 
While we find no meaningful effects, the possibility of a long-tenn 
payoff from constituency service remains. Perhaps more detailed models of 
the relationship between constituency service and incumbent vote need to be 
developed and tested. Fiorina supports this position and argues that the 
service-vote relationship is complex and non-recursive. 33 In their "Reply" 
to Fiorina's comments, however, McAdams and Johannes indicated that 
they " .. . made every reasonable effort to test for interactions and alter-
native functional forms" and still did not find a relationship between atten-
tion and vote. 34 We tested more complex models with additi onal controls 
and lagged variables and did not detect an impact of attention on vote. 31 
Further research should not only investigate simultane ous effects but 
should also be sensitive to alternative explanations. For example, consti-
tuents may expect a certain level of attentiveness. 36 Incumbents may be 
susceptible to a blackmail effect, as increased district attentive ness raises 
constituency expectations. Attentiveness above some undetermined level 
may not increase incumbent electoral margins, but incumbents may be 
punished electorally for dropping below district expectations over an ex-
tended period of time. Thus incumbents who create a home style based on 
district attentiveness may find their constituents expect it to continue and 
are displeased if it does not. However, researchers may need to design more 
sensitive measures of incumbent safety. District attentiveness , casework, 
and incumbent contacts may only affect a small, yet important, percentage 
of the vote. Perhaps if we knew how much of the congressional vote could 
be attributed to local forces the direct effects of these variables would 
become apparent. This research has not addressed these questions but, we 
hope, future research will. 
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